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Will the lessons be learned? Reflections on Local Authority 
evaluations and the use of research evidence  
 
Abstract 
 
Sure Start programmes are complex, community-based initiatives – fore-
runners of the Children’s Centres Initiative - which have been evaluated 
nationally and locally. Using an in-depth, retrospective case study of an 
evaluation of one local programme, the authors raise key issues pertinent 
to both practice and evaluation in the field, highlighting conflicts and 
dilemmas both within evaluation generally and, specifically relating to the 
evaluation of this programme. We illustrate the difficulties placed upon 
local evaluators by the lack of clear structures within which to work, and 
provide useful lessons as we move forward into the development and 
evaluations of new services for children and families. 
 
Keywords: Sure Start; Evaluation; complex community initiatives. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
University research has many facets: there are high-status projects, 
funded by research councils and government departments which take 
almost as much time and energy to bid for as to complete, commissioned 
work from partner organisations, charities and other funders where 
shared agendas can be generated or significant compromises brokered and 
there are smaller projects, which may add to our understanding of the 
field and our research expertise but which are also pragmatically 
undertaken to keep researchers in their jobs between the (hopefully) 
larger projects. The authors of this paper have been working in social 
science research for a combined thirty years, and on 50+ projects, mostly 
in educational research focused on issues of inclusion, social justice, family 
learning, the exploration of professional roles and multi-professional 
working. We have a profound interest in, and a commitment to, the 
innovative work carried out in the Local Authorities (LAs) in our region. 
We place great respect and value on work where professionals from a 
range of education, health and social care backgrounds constantly break 
new ground in finding ways to work with young children and their 
families, to provide services, opportunities and spaces where needs can be 
more precisely identified and met.  
 
This paper reports on our experience as a Higher Education Institution 
(HEI), and those of the LA, of one such evaluation study – an evaluation of 
a local Sure Start programme. Our intention is to make explicit how 
professionals can operate in this difficult area. We firstly explore the 
nature of the evidence hoped for through both the local and the national 
evaluation of Sure Start, followed by a discussion on what evidence was 
actually practicable to collect. The complexities and tensions that such a 
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task reveals are highlighted, which will serve to illuminate the potential 
experiences of others who are embarking on similar evaluative work. 
Finally, given the complex nature of evaluating community initiatives, we 
explore the reality of how the information gleaned through the evaluation 
was used. We present a descriptive model of evaluative research, which 
highlights areas where formative information-flow between project 
workers/programme managers and evaluators is problematic. We argue 
that there are gaps between the expectations of the evaluations and what 
was feasible, and then in turn between what was feasible and how the 
information was used.  
 
Sure Start and the role of Local Authorities 
Sure Start is a cross-Government funded programme in England which 
was put in place to join up services for families with young children under 
5 years old living in poverty and suffering the consequences of social 
exclusion. It aims to achieve better outcomes for children, parents and 
communities by: 
• increasing the availability of childcare for all children  
• improving health and emotional development for young children  
• supporting parents as parents and in their aspirations towards 
employment. (http://www.surestart.gov.uk/aboutsurestart/). 
The first local programmes were set up in 1999, and were area-based 
initiatives. Latest figures indicate an investment of £760 million between 
1999-2004 (Moss, 2004), with further funding of £4,317 million projected 
2005-8 (Hodge, 2004). Many of the original local programmes now form 
the basis of the Sure Start Children’s Centres, for which the Government 
is spending £2.2 billion on revenue and over £1 billion on capital between 
2004 and 2008 (NAO, 2006). Funding aside, what is key to the national 
programme is that it is a multidisciplinary intervention programme which 
is:   
• targeted at individual health, learning and social-emotional 
development and also aims to strengthen families and communities;  
• is an agent for change in local service delivery charged with 
pioneering and then mainstreaming innovative ways of joining up 
services and working more sensitively and democratically with 
families; and  
• intends to exemplify the relationship between research, evidence 
and practice (Eisenstadt, 2000; 2002).   
 
The Sure Start, Extended Schools and Childcare Group claims that is 
currently developing a comprehensive research programme that both adds 
to and complements existing work for children and families (see: 
http://www.surestart.gov.uk/research/). The national programme is a long-
term, wide ranging study designed to evaluate the efficacy and cost-
effectiveness of Sure Start. The first phase of the national evaluation runs 
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from 2001 to 2008. Sure Start appeared, therefore, to grasp the mettle of 
evaluation work, and to meet this commitment, and it is this issue which 
is the main focus of our paper. However, firstly we explore the context of 
local programmes within Local Authorities.  
Local Authorities (LAs) are hemmed in by confusing and at times 
contradictory messages about how to meet the specific needs of the people 
in their areas. Stronger and stronger managerial and reporting structures 
(Sanderson, 2001; Boyne, 2002) and the politics and policies of ‘best value’ 
(Geddes & Martin, 2000) make it clear that LAs must identify the most 
effective and efficient means of providing services – often by following 
templates offered by ‘beacon’ (flagship) councils identified and awarded as 
‘excellent’ (Dyson, et al., 2000). In addition, LAs are expected to innovate 
and respond to the context and needs of their particular area. The 
pressure to be always innovating and learning – a ‘coasting’ authority 
should in fact be ‘striving’ (Freer, 2002) – will inevitably put pressure on 
existing resources. There now exists a website dedicated to local 
Government Performance, where one can compare one local authority with 
another (http://www.bvpi.gov.uk/pages/Index.asp).  
 
The development of such performance management in the UK within the 
context of the ‘new public management’ has been primarily ‘top-down’ with 
a dominant concern for enhancing control and ‘upwards accountability’ 
rather than directly promoting learning and improvement from the 
ground level. Additionally, in recent years, LAs have faced a shift in their 
role as direct service providers, to one where determining policy and 
strategy is increasingly as important. In the past, however, LAs have 
tended to rely heavily on short-term project funding, often stitching 
together funding from a range of initiatives – New Deal for Communities, 
Education Action Zones, Area Regeneration Grants – in order to support 
their priorities. This pragmatic use of funding reflects both the ingenuity 
of local government workers and the extent to which national policy 
agendas tend to overlap, so that it becomes feasible to represent a single 
project increasing the communication skills of nursery and reception 
children in a socially deprived area as fulfilling the objectives of all of the 
previously cited programmes and thereby ensure the project’s longevity. 
However, in relation to childcare, what is crucial now for LAs is the 
dramatic shift in their role from implementing these individual 
programmes or projects, to commissioning and managing the childcare 
market as a whole. As a result of the Childcare Act 2006, LAs now have 
new duties to assess the parental demand for childcare; to secure 
sufficient childcare and to provide an information service for parents of 
children aged up to 20. Such a shift has particular relevance for Sure Start 
programmes, and the further development of Children’s Centres, as these 
fit with the pressure from Government for SSLPs to move from reactive 
intervention to proactive prevention to meet the needs of the most 
vulnerable children (DfES, 2004). 
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What kinds of evidence did we hope for?  
Regardless of the good intentions and aims of any initiative or programme, 
evaluation must be an essential and necessary integrated feature. What is 
key to the evaluation of Sure Start programmes is the reality that there 
are two levels: the national evaluation and the local evaluation, commonly 
referred to as ‘dual level’ evaluation. Allen and Black (2006) discuss the 
difficulties and possibilities of the dual level evaluation of Sure Start 
programmes and describe Sure Start as an example of a Complex 
Community Initiative (CCI). Sure Start is indeed a perfect example of a 
large, complex, multi-level, multi-sited and ambitious community 
initiative programme which inevitably raises issues around evaluation, 
both nationally and locally. Consequently, evaluations of such community 
initiatives need to be more sophisticated and there is increasing desire for 
evaluation approaches that take into account scientific rigour and 
experimental research while still addressing the complexities of systems 
change work in community settings (Weiss, 2003). However, there have 
been criticisms made that review at LA level is more focussed on 
performance management and monitoring rather than effective evaluation 
which is integrated into planning and ‘best practice’ approaches to 
improving service delivery (Sanderson et al., 2003). 
 
The national evaluation (see: http://www.ness.bbk.ac.uk/) was set up to 
monitor the implementation and outcomes of the first 260 (of the total 
524) local programmes and to collate and analyse the local evaluations 
that each Sure Start Local Programme (SSLP) had to commission. While 
the parameters of data collection for the national evaluation were set, the 
form and content of local evaluations has evolved differently in local 
programmes (Allen and Black, 2006), providing an opportunity for local 
programmes to decide on their own evaluative priorities but also 
presenting some problems of cross-programme comparison. Sure Start 
guidelines for local programmes state the distinctness between the 
national and local evaluation:  
 
“The national evaluation will answer the questions: ‘What 
difference did Sure Start make to the children in it, and which 
activities made the most difference’…. Local evaluations on the 
other hand, will deal with the questions ‘what are we doing and how 
well are we doing it?” (Sure Start, 2002, Annexe 6, p. 2).  
 
Although evaluation is a part of the management culture and in ‘public 
speech’, there appear to be several structural problems which can limit the 
effectiveness of the evaluation process in improving and spreading 
innovative practice. These include the quality of information management 
(Jones and Hughes, 2001); the nature of decision making about innovative 
practice; the extent to which ‘generations of difficulty’ and the structural 
problems in society can be ‘solved’ at local level (Alcock and Craig, 1998) 
and the limits to measuring the impact of individual programmes 
(Gustafsson and Driver, 2005; Boot and Macdonald, 2006). 
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Experimentation – and Sure Start could certainly be labelled as such - 
requires the possibility of failure, a failure that can hopefully be analysed 
to provide better questions and approaches.  
 
Ultimately, Sure Start is about trying new things – some will work, some 
won’t – and we should not berate those whose work has not worked as well 
as hoped. The benefits of local evaluation should not be undervalued - case 
studies can illuminate issues that are bound to occur in many other cases 
and the way in which we have to clarify and reflect upon key issues could 
be highly relevant to people trying to clarify and reflect upon services in 
their different contexts. Evaluation should be integral to practice, 
especially where practice is/should be innovative and we can learn from 
other local programmes, e.g. Sheffield, where evaluation was part of all 
Sure Start job specifications and staff were expected to contribute to 
evaluation work (Weinberger et al, 2005). 
 
Evaluation is a required element in most funding packages and guidelines 
indicate that local Sure Start programmes should allocate between 3% and 
5% (capped) of their overall budget to local evaluation (Sure Start, 2002). 
Whilst local programmes are welcome to co-ordinate and facilitate the 
evaluation themselves, they can (and usually do) commission external 
evaluators, such as a HEI or a research consultant. We were 
commissioned (following competitive tendering) by the LA to conduct a 
three-year evaluation, costing £39,000 in total, of a local Sure Start 
programme. Whilst any evaluation has limitations relating to sample 
representation, incomplete datasets and research design, through this 
evaluation, we were keen to explore the processes of delivery and practice 
within the area, and provide useful, regular feedback on the projects and 
the delivery of services within it. We never set out to provide a summative 
evaluation which focussed purely on numerical and quantitative data; but 
adopted Cronbach’s (1982) view of formative evaluation that, as soon as an 
innovation is implemented it evolves in relation to the local and national 
context.  
 
The position of the HEI (in our case) was, in theory, to be at the centre of 
both the national and local programme and the evaluation both locally and 
nationally. We propose that the conceptual model – illustrated in Figure 1 
below - demonstrates, the theoretical, or expected, relationship between 
the HEI and the Sure Start programme. 
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Figure 1: Dual level Evaluation: A theoretical model  
 
We anticipated that our position as researchers would be quite pivotal in 
the grand scheme of the programme, placed somewhere central between 
the national and local programme. The dual levels are represented by the 
two colours (blue and yellow) with a central green area to illustrate some 
cross-over. Dotted lines represent our perceptions of permeable boundaries 
between the two levels, and unbroken arrows stand for the anticipated 
lines of communication and guidance. The two-way directionality of the 
arrows  imply that this guidance would be both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’.  
 
Our evaluation focus was always planned to be a formative one, which is 
typically conducted during the development or improvement of a 
particular programme or project, often with the intention of helping 
programme staff identify ways in which they can improve delivery. By 
adopting this approach to the evaluation, we not only acknowledged the 
developing nature of the Sure Start programme, we also acknowledged the 
fact that all Sure Start programme staff are – usually informally – 
constantly doing their own formative evaluation. The reality was, 
however, that the parameters of the project were set up long ago – and 
despite our commitment, we would have set it up differently if we had 
been designing a research project from scratch – and our appearance on 
the scene was too late to do much more than a post-hoc reflection. 
Formative though it was in intention, any project where the parameters of 
success are not mutually agreed before it starts risks being merely 
summative.   
 
What evidence was feasible? 
Although national guidance and training about evaluation assumed that 
evaluators would be an integral part of the programme, our experiences 
HEI 
National 
Sure Start 
Local Sure 
Start 
 
Dual level 
Evaluation 
National 
Evaluation 
Local 
Evaluation 
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were very similar to Allen and Black’s who reported they were seen as 
‘auditors’ who were checking up on their work. We were keen to set our 
formative findings in the context of more quantitative data (e.g. 
attendance, registration and demographic data). However, the data 
management systems which would have enabled a monitoring strand 
within the evaluation had still not been installed by the time of our final 
meeting in March 2006. Whilst this was disappointing for us as 
evaluators, it was even worse for programme staff, who were extremely 
frustrated at being unable to prove that they had satisfied key 
performance criteria. 
 
The model contained within the national guidance on evaluation assumes 
that the evaluator will be consistently feeding back findings which are 
then taken on board by the programmes and fed into project design and 
delivery, and this would certainly fit with our conceptual model of the 
theory of evaluating a Sure Start programme. The reality, however, 
proved to be very different, and a conceptual model of where we felt we 
actually ‘fit’ as researchers is illustrated in the second model (Figure 2) 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Dual level Evaluation: A realistic model  
 
Considerable delays hampered the progress of the evaluation. Due to start 
in June 2002, it actually started in February 2003, only to be suspended 
when the Manager departed from the Programme and then revived in 
December 2003 when a replacement was appointed. At that time, staffing 
issues were clearly important for the programme team, and we were 
informed that the evaluation was not a priority. However, we completed a 
‘Baseline’ survey of local opinion and awareness of the local programme 
(Hall and Clark, 2004).  
Uni 
National 
Sure Start 
Local 
Sure Start 
 
Dual level 
Evaluation 
National 
Evaluation 
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Evaluation 
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In our particular evaluation, there were two levels of reporting and 
collaboration within the project: one with the local programme team and 
their Executive Board, which included local councillors and parents from 
the areas and another which was the strategic management level within 
the Local Authority. Regular meetings were held with the programme 
management and the Executive Board at which case study topics were 
advanced by management and accepted by the research team. Two 
observational case studies were undertaken of projects within Sure Start 
focussing on children’s creative and language development in 2004-5. In 
addition, during this time, two ‘away-days’ were organised and facilitated 
by the research team, and were held at Newcastle University for the 
entire local programme team. Part of this process was to allow the 
research team to explore issues of multi-professional working with the 
whole group, and to develop new research tools to elicit better 
understanding of the processes at work. The first session included an 
exercise to ‘map’ the multi-professional links within the Sure Start team 
and beyond, linking with other agencies. The second session included an 
extended discussion of the role of the multi professional and the competing 
priorities of community work, in the context externally imposed targets 
and awareness of the specific needs of the community. Two further case 
studies, one of a support programme for children with language difficulties 
and one of working with ‘hard to reach’ families were planned. Both of 
these case studies were subsequently cancelled by the programme 
management and a draft final report was submitted.  
 
At this stage the overt involvement of the strategic managers came to the 
fore and a period of negotiation over the content and presentation of the 
final report began, which was finally concluded in March 2006. The main 
concern for the strategic level managers was the formative nature of the 
case studies, which raised problems and areas for development as well as 
highlighting good practice. From their perspective, Sure Start had to be 
presented as an example of good local management and a springboard to 
their ambitious development of Children’s Centres across the borough and 
from our perspective, leaving out any comments that were not wholly 
positive amounted to an unethical use of research evidence. It became 
explicitly obvious to us, as evaluators, that Government officials be they 
local or national, want, and indeed need to be seen as efficient and 
effective. In particular, they were unhappy with our report on multi-
professional working, specifically the view of the Sure Start professionals 
that their main barriers were linked to structural and management issues 
in the Authority. This is a major tension in project evaluation: a main 
objective of the initiative has not been fulfilled, or has been only partially 
achieved, because of factors beyond the scope and remit of that project. 
The evaluators must report this, normally in local evaluations, to the 
managers who have within their remit the theoretical power to address 
these factors – though it must be allowed, rarely the actual money, time or 
other resources to do so.  
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How was the evidence used? 
The complexity of the programmes, their many targets, the difficulties of 
measurement and information management are all key issues which add 
to the overall difficulties of evaluating ‘success’ or impact. Increasing 
numbers of commentators suggest that it is the very complexity of Sure 
Start that will doom it to failure (Ormerod, 2005; Factcheck, 2006). Moss 
(2004:632) questions the contradictory nature of Sure Start as an early 
years intervention as a whole, and refers in particular to the tensions that 
then exist between the local and national programmes: ‘while there is 
some latitude for local diversity, local programmes are strongly governed 
at a distance by “the evaluative state”. The scope for significant and 
transgressive local experimentation is severely constrained’.  Similarly, 
Willan (2007:23) – after reading emerging reports from the national 
evaluation team writes:  
 
... one gets a feeling of complexity, conflicting expectations, and 
inherent contradictions between what politicians want (a solution to 
poor social and educational prospects), what policy-makers want (an 
umbrella service for ‘problem’ families/communities), what the 
centres want (a useful local service centred on the needs of children 
and their parents) and what families want (a drop-in place to meet, 
staffed by knowledgeable professionals; an information point; and 
somewhere for the children to enjoy high-quality play).  
 
Edgley and Avis (2006:434) further explores this in relation to multi-
professional working: ‘the combination of Sure Start being both demand-
led and a form of co-ordinated service provision also produced paradoxical 
outcomes and thus collaborative strain for some mainstream 
professionals.’  
 
Indeed such tensions were evident in our evaluation. The professionals in 
the local programme reported that there were tensions between the 
external expectations of Sure Start (i.e. the national, ‘bigger’ picture) and 
their genuine excitement in, and commitment to, the innovative work done 
in collaboration with one another and with the local community. Other 
programmes have reported the tension which exists for them of the local 
agenda versus the national agenda – in particular in relation to (the late) 
national guidance on local evaluation. The ‘changing goalposts’ described 
by Allen and Black (242) on what should or should not be included in local 
evaluation has caused even more tensions for local programmes and their 
evaluators, and has resulted in less innovative or action research 
approaches to be adopted in the evaluations. Equally difficult are the 
apparent target-setting changes (e.g. smoking cessation) –which are set 
and changed nationally, which are then left to the local programmes and 
their management to ‘re-sell’ to their teams (Weinberger et al, 2005). 
 
Local programme staff in our study reported feeling confused as to 
whether we were ultimately working for Sure Start, the Local Authority or 
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the community served by the programme and this lack of clarity about 
accountability is reflected in other evaluations of SSLPs (Allen and Black, 
2006). For the strategic managers in the LA, the complexity of 
implementation and the focus on outcomes assessment were of paramount 
concern, so that the evaluation design – focussed as it was on process – 
had little to offer them: “a distraction from the main event” (Allen and 
Black, 2006: 242). Even if research and evaluation was viewed as an 
integral component of service delivery, we feel that ultimately service 
responsibilities would have taken priority.  
 
Research is starting to emerge which reports the difficulties that many 
Sure Start programmes face, related to staffing in particular, and this was 
certainly the case within our evaluation. Staff changes (and resulting 
shortages) had a significant impact on the delivery of specific activities 
within the local area. Often with Sure Start programmes, staff have to 
step out of their ‘historical’ roles and programmes face losses of key staff. 
This can be for a variety of reasons - the excellence in training and 
experience received adds to the CV and staff move on. Most Sure Start 
staff are on short-term contracts, and so mobility (in both directions) can 
only be expected. The feeling that Local Programmes have ‘poached’ the 
best people, while not entirely justified, is certainly a factor in the 
difficulties experienced by staff in taking innovative practice back to their 
colleagues in mainstream (Tunstill, et al., 2005; Hall and Clark, 2005). In 
these terms, Sure Start could be regarded as either a professional 
opportunity or a professional cul de sac. Edgley and Avis (2006) explored 
the experiences of professionals working collaboratively within Sure Start 
areas and reported that this had not fostered innovation in their own 
working practices. Activities and services which already existed routinely 
in the area were re-presented under the ‘umbrella’ of Sure Start, but 
resource constraints prevented innovative working. Key to these 
professionals was the fact that they were working in deprived areas, not 
because it was Sure Start per se. Conversely, the National Sure Start 
Evaluation team (http://www.ness.bbk.ac.uk/) have produced a series of 
synthesis reports on the implementation of the local programmes which 
conclude that while there has been considerable variation between the 
circumstances inherited by individual programmes, the key determining 
factors for successful implementation have been the role of the manager 
and the ability to build and maintain partnerships with other agencies 
and to engage with families at the level which was appropriate to their 
needs (Tunstill, et al., 2005). 
 
Like other Sure Start programmes (see Weinberger et al, 2005) the local 
programme did not have access to basic information and data about 
families locally, and there were issues about data sharing and 
confidentiality – all factors which may well have an impact on ‘success’. 
For our partners in the SSLP, these external parameters, delays and 
imposed agendas were familiar elements from our previous research work, 
though there was a sense that within Sure Start the levels of surveillance 
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and the stakes in general were higher. The researchers’ role in raising the 
stakes should not be ignored – we regarded ourselves as partners, as 
‘critical friends’ but at the beginning of any evaluation we must be more 
aware that our presence is threatening, alien, accepted as a necessary evil 
but fundamentally unwanted. This ‘high stakes’ atmosphere worked 
against iterative development of projects and working relationships and 
overall, our mutual feeling was that while some changes in practice had 
taken place, the collaborative learning was not sustained over a long 
enough period to really embed in practice.  
 
With the general tensions and contradictions related to such a huge, 
complex programme as Sure Start, it is no wonder that evaluation – at 
both national and local level – is a massive undertaking. On a macro level, 
Sure Start is about targeting individuals at risk of social exclusion - a task 
which is difficult enough: ‘categorising, identifying, reaching and engaging 
with the groups poses major problems, not least of definition’ (Willan, 
2006:28). On the micro level, Sure Start local programmes are individual 
complex community initiatives which are geographically bounded and 
which offer a specific service delivered within targeted neighbourhood 
contexts. It does appear that considerable weight and responsibility has 
been placed on Sure Start local programmes to dramatically change the 
lives – for the better - of young children and their families. However, how 
far should this responsibility be taken? The very nature of the contexts of 
programmes means that they are based in areas with issues/problems that 
could be regarded as more structural, such as inadequate housing, high 
unemployment, etc. It is these complex issues which local programmes 
face in their delivery: structural ambiguity; conflicting priorities; resource 
shortfalls; local history and co-ordination of a range of professional 
opinions.  
 
All these can clearly impact on ‘success’ or ‘impact’, and this is where 
evaluation comes in. There is a general consensus that many of the 
impacts of Sure Start may well not be measurable for ten years (Jowell, 
2003, quoted in Tunstill, et al., 2005), or even once the targeted children 
have grown up, so 20 years (Factcheck, 2006). At present, therefore, it is 
not possible to say from the evidence presented that Sure Start ‘works’, 
though we can say that it has reportedly been implemented more or less 
according to plan. What research evidence does exist in the academic 
literature, are examples of dissemination of successful projects (for 
example, Brown and Liddle, 2005; Bagley et al., 2004; Urwin, 2003; Morris 
and Leavey, 2006; Weinberger et al, 2005) which may signal attempts to 
‘spread the word’, though what we know of professional cultures of 
learning suggest that grassroots networks would have greater impact.  
 
The idea is that Sure Start is designed to promote innovation, or at least, 
innovative ways of working, and indeed local programmes have been 
described as a ‘test bed’ for developing new and imaginative strategies to 
promote access to services (Garbers et al., 2006) – so is it more likely to 
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fail? For each positive finding from Sure Start, there appears to be an 
equally damning one. A large scale study suggests that the impact on 
deprived families is not universal, specifically, that “SSLPs seem to 
benefit relatively less socially deprived parents (who have greater 
personal resources) and their children but seem to have an adverse effect 
on the most disadvantaged children” (Belsky et al., 2006:1476). While 
another study of personal and cognitive outcomes (Schneider et al., 2006) 
found that there were no discernable impacts on educational outcomes and 
only tentative links to be made between Sure Start and better non-
academic outcomes. Contradictory evidence such as these examples as led 
Belsky to conclude: ‘there is enough variation in the results that there is 
grist for everyone’s mill’ (quoted in Factcheck, 2006): the results of the 
evaluations can be either used to ‘support or to trash Sure Start’.  
 
Conclusions 
Many local projects have carried out minimal evaluation and evaluators 
have struggled to support them and to carry out evaluation (Allen and 
Black: 242), and that was our experience (see also Hall and Clark, 2007). 
Our relationships with members of the SSLP remained positive and 
informative on both sides, evidenced by the ‘away-days’ where 
understandings from fieldwork were explored collaboratively and new 
explanations sought. The extent to which we arrived at a mutually 
acceptable compromise with strategic managers can be judged by the 
circumstances that the final report has been accepted by the LA, but not 
published and we are not naming the authority in this paper.  
 
Although this paper is a case study of one local Sure Start programme, it 
is a focused study which raises many issues which can act as both a 
theoretical and as a practical resource for evaluators, policy-makers and 
practitioners as they put together and further develop structures such as 
Children’s Centres. Though too early to see the long-term impact of 
Children’s Centres, a recent report from the National Audit Office (NAO, 
2006) makes for depressing reading. They report that 56% of LAs are not 
monitoring the performance of their Centres and almost as many (52%) 
are not working to identify the cost or cost-effectiveness of services. The 
role of Universities as evaluators will continue to be important, and we 
need to remember that unpublished lessons are more likely to be forgotten 
than learned.  
 
Several clear messages emerge from our experience. Fundamentally, the 
purpose of the evaluation needs to be explicitly agreed between local 
government, national government and the evaluators. All parties will 
then, hopefully, have a much more realistic idea and expectation of what 
is actually achievable. Competing agendas may be inevitable in local 
evaluation work but it would be as well to know who is competing from the 
start. Secondly, it is vital that all parties understand what is realistic for 
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the evaluation to explore alongside the extent to which learning and 
development are goals of the evaluation. Often learning is an ‘added extra’ 
of a process which is more about validating implementation processes. 
Finally, an important consideration is how evidence collected can be 
potentially be used. The areas of vulnerability need to be openly discussed. 
Even where there is a commitment to a formative evaluation, some areas 
of organisation or practice may be deemed ‘off limits’, often for important 
operational reasons. This would fit with what Spicer and Smith (2008) 
refer to as fostering a genuine ‘dialogic relationship’ – meaning that 
dialogue can help to ensure ongoing relevance of an evaluation as such 
programmes naturally develop.  
Michael Rutter, a professor at the Institute of Psychiatry who criticised 
the Government after advising it over its Sure Start programme for 
families in disadvantaged areas, said: "The Government definitely doesn't 
want evidence, although the rhetoric is entirely different." (2006). The 
structures and governance of dual level reporting does not seem to have 
worked effectively for Sure Start. One could argue that our initial 
conceptual expectation of being central to the national and local 
programmes was somewhat naive, perhaps even unrealistic. However, 
guidance and frameworks did lead us to believe that this would be the 
case and this was not the reality. Similar experiences are borne out 
through recent works such as Spicer and Smith (2008) who, with reference 
to evaluating complex, area-based initiatives, argue: “independent local 
evaluations commissioned by the partnerships have had limited influence 
on programme design and implementation, and indeed have been highly 
contested in their use” (p.75). 
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